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Abstract 
An extensive literature on social movements points to the role of social networks in movement 
recruitment and development. It is anomalous, therefore, that treatments of Chinese social 
movements seldom acknowledge the importance of guanxi networks. Theories of social 
movements are typically constructed on the basis of US and European cases and draw upon the 
intellectual formations of these regions. Through an examination of social movements in 
contemporary China it is shown that guanxi is not only relevant to the operation of social 
movements but to our understanding of how social movements are formed and also how they are 
suppressed and undermined by the state. It will be shown that by theorising social movements in 
China in terms of guanxi there is scope to augment social network approaches to social 
movements.  
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The significance of social networks for the formation and operation of social movements is 
widely acknowledged (Diani, 1995; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; 
Gould, 1991; 1993; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Snow et al., 1980). An extensive literature 
search, however, identified very few items in which discussion of Chinese social movements 
acknowledged a role for guanxi, the elemental basis of Chinese networks.  A number of books 
devoted to collective action in contemporary China were also consulted; the majority failed to 
even include an entry for guanxi in their index. Guanxi is a form of long-term interpersonal 
relation formed and governed by implicit social norms, including xinyong (trustworthiness), 
mianzi (face), renqing (norms of interpersonal behavior), reciprocity in favour exchange, and 
obligation (Barbalet, 2014: 54; Qi, 2013: 310). The obligation generated in guanxi exchange is a 
resource frequently applied to instrumental purposes.   
 
While guanxi operates through enduring ties China’s post-1980s economic liberalisation has 
produced the conditions for the emergence of social movements, including peasant and also 
labour movements, which are typically spontaneous and short-lived. It will be shown below that 
while social movements in China are typically ephemeral and episodic events the social context 
in which they occur is characterized by long-lasting guanxi relations which are in numerous 
ways implicated in the expression of social movements as well as their curtailment. A likely 
reason for the absence of guanxi from studies of social movements in contemporary China is that 
sociological methodologies and theories applied to the study of Chinese societies and social 
phenomena are predominantly produced in America and Western Europe, from where they are 
disseminated to the rest of the world (see Connell, 2007; Qi, 2014). Indeed, the theories and 
methodologies which underwrite research on social movements in China are mostly adopted 
from studies of American and European cases, experiences and theorisation (Qi, 2012; Wu, 
2009). It is of particular interest that in describing as well as conceptualising interpersonal 
connections in Chinese social movements the majority of studies refer to social networks even 
though guanxi may be a more appropriate term, possibly revealing an assumption that the two 
are equivalent or interchangeable (see Barbalet, 2015).  
 
It is appropriate to ask whether theories which conceptualise social relations and institutions in 
the US or Europe are capable of universal application, as typically claimed by their proponents 
(see Bhambra, 2007; Connell, 2007; Qi, 2014; Rodríguez, Boatca and Costa, 2010). While not 
commenting on the cultural origins of theories and concepts, Melucci (1996: 3) draws cautionary 
attention to a mismatch between ‘the inadequacy of the analytical tools available’ and ‘the 
increasing diffusion of … phenomena and their diversification’. Other researchers have begun to 
observe ‘awkward’ social movements, by which is meant phenomena that appear to be social 
movements, but did not fit currently available categories (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; Davis, 
1999; Polletta, 2006). Davis (1999) earlier pointed out that the political process approach to 
social movements is a US-biased model inadequate for explanation of Latin American social 
experiences. One response to this type of problem within social movement research has been the 
development of more comprehensive theories that attempt to integrate social structure and 
culture, human agency and structure, affect and organisation and so on (Benford, 1997; Jasper, 
1997). Another possible response, to be presented here, is to draw on non-Western, in this case, 





Through an examination of social movements in contemporary China the present paper will 
show that guanxi is not only relevant to the operation and mobilisation of social movements but 
it will also indicate how our understanding of the nature of guanxi can be expanded by 
considering its operation in the context of social movements. It will be shown that by theorising 
social movements in China in terms of guanxi there is scope to augment standard social networks 
approaches to social movements. An ever-present element of the incidence of social movements 
in China is the likelihood of official suppression. An aspect of this is the way in which guanxi is 
used by state authorities in their attempts to repress and undermine social movements. This paper 
provides an exploratory examination of guanxi in social movements in mainland China through a 
discussion of both social movement theory and Chinese cases. In particular, the contribution to 
the social movement literature of the discussion below is through revision of the extant 
understanding of the nature and role of social networks in social movements. Whereas current 
research typically focusses on organized social networks, a consideration of guanxi networks in 
social movements in China revises accepted assumptions concerning identity, tie-strength and 
volitional possibilities in networks. The role of social networks in social movement recruitment 
and mobilization is widely acknowledged; discussion below indicates that guanxi networks 
affect the emergence, development and outcome of collective actions. Guanxi is utilized not only 
by activists but also by the state, in the suppression and repression of social movements. Thus an 
examination of guanxi expands understanding of the network-movement interface and therefore 
of both the forms and applications of social networks in social movements and the variable forms 
and possibilities of social movements themselves. 
 
Importance of guanxi in Chinese society 
Before considering the connection between guanxi and social movements it is necessary to 
indicate the significance of guanxi in Chinese society. In Western Europe, the US and other 
societies influenced by Protestant culture individuals are presumed to be autonomous, to behave 
on the basis of decisions determined by their individual will and subject to the rule of law. 
Individual rights, identified in and secured through a legal constitution, specify the basis and 
scope of individual autonomy. In Chinese society, on the other hand, individuals are embedded 
in social relationships in which there are obligations defined by the roles through which social 
engagements occur. Chinese society, in this sense, is composed of ‘overlapping networks of 
people linked together through differentially categorised social relationships’ (Hamilton and 
Wang, 1992: 20; see Fei, 1992).The Chinese conception of an individual is based on the 
individual’s interaction with others as bearers of roles and hierarchically structured positions. An 
individual is not only defined by his or her fulfillment of role obligations but individuals achieve 
their purposes through mobilisation of his or her social connections. Pye (1968: 173-174) 
provocatively says that the very basis of a Chinese person’s understanding of the world is in the 
‘web’ of relationships in which he or she is embedded, that the manipulation of guanxi becomes 
naturalised as a necessary means for the accomplishment of tasks.  
 
It is not claimed here that these forms are unique to China. Indeed, particularistic ties similar to 
guanxi have been noticed in disparate societies which, like China, have an enduring agrarian 
basis (Beinin and Vairel, 2011; Clark, 2004; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Lim, 2012; 
Michailova and Worm, 2003; Piattoni, 2001). The assimilation of guanxi with Italian 
clientelismo, Russian blat, Egyptian wasata (wāsiṭah) and similar phenomena is typically 
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achieved by regarding them all as variants of clientelism. While this is possibly an acceptable 
approach at a level of high generality it leads to misunderstanding of the details of particular 
cases. Indeed, clientelism has a number of characteristics in general that are not replicated in 
guanxi in particular, including the necessary mediation of a patron in general distributive 
relations as well as enduring asymmetrical power relations (Clark, 2004: 946; García, 2014: 799-
800). The obligations of guanxi are located in horizontal relations of esteem rather than vertical 
dominance-dependency relations, as in clientelism, and where guanxi is an expression of 
political patronage (Wank, 1999, 2009) it is facilitated by exchanges between different forms of 
power, political and economic, that would be disrupted by significant power inequalities. 
 
Whilst arguably having traditional origins guanxi was strengthened during the Mao era. It is 
ironic that while the Communist party made vigorous endeavours to uproot traditional elements 
of Chinese culture, including particularistic relations (Vogal, 1965), guanxi became important as 
an unintended consequence of the party’s bureaucratic control of goods and resources because it 
was a culturally available means of circumventing such control (Gold, 1985; Yang, 2002). 
Additionally, the dependency of individuals on their danwei (work unit) in cities and shenchan 
dui (production team) in villages created a ‘culture of organised dependency’ that was negotiated 
by guanxi relations (Walder 1986). Because guanxi involves personal connections in the 
formation and maintenance of long-term relationships party members relied on guanxi to secure 
loyalty in achievement of political goals. The importance of guanxi operates at all levels of the 
Chinese Communist polity and society (Jacobs, 1979: 239; King, 1991).  
 
China’s embrace of the market economy since 1978 has been described as leading to a society 
with three layers of institutions: the state, the market, and guanxi networks (Boisot and Child, 
1996). Rather than a distinct institutional layer, however, guanxi networks are embedded in both 
the state and market. It is important to note that the state and market, while notionally distinct, 
are not separate but interconnected. With the closure of state-owned enterprises and the 
disbandment of production teams guanxi relations are less relevant for such things as the 
allocation of housing. But the continuing interconnection of plan and market creates both the 
need and the opportunity for the use of guanxi. A new form of guanxi network arises in these 
circumstances between private business and officials. Business-persons need the assistance of 
officials for access to licenses, resources, venues, protection and so on as ‘favours’. At the same 
time, officials need business to stimulate the local economy as demonstration of the officials’ 
competence in managing the new reform environment (see Wank, 2009). Marketisation has not 
eliminated guanxi, therefore, as some scholars (Guthrie, 1998) predicted, but strengthened the 
instrumental aspects of guanxi networks. Guanxi remains an important component of the social 
fabric of mainland China today. Indeed, guanxi is fundamental ‘to the understanding of Chinese 
social structure’ not only in mainland China but also in Taiwan, Hong Kong and among overseas 
Chinese populations elsewhere (Gold, 1985: 674; King, 1991: 63). Given the significance of 
guanxi in Chinese society it is unlikely that it has no role to play in social movements in China. 
 
An absence of formal channels for Chinese social movements 
Resource mobilisation theory, which is dominant in the field, holds that social movements are 
primarily mobilised through the facilitation of formal organisation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 
1215). Although the role of social networks in the formation of social movements is increasingly 
recognised as significant, as when social movements are defined as ‘networks of informal 
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interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations’ (Diani, 1992: 8), 
there remains a strong focus on organised networks in which there are varying degrees of 
institutionalisation, rule-governed procedures and routinised membership so that the identity of 
members is given by the groups to which they belong. In this consideration it is of interest that 
one of the rare studies of guanxi networks in social movements in China indicates a reverse 
situation in which ‘individual characteristics, identities, and ties that construct the network’ are 
primary in setting the character of the movement ‘rather than the profile, characteristics, and 
relations of organizations’ (Xie and Mol, 2006: 274).  
 
The difficulty with approaches to social movements that define them in terms of formal 
organisation, for the study of social movements in China, is that in China it is illegal for civic 
organisations to engage in collective action. Workers are not allowed to form unions independent 
of the state-controlled ‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions’ (ACFTU) (Chen, 2007: 65-69; 
Pringle, 2011) whereas in the West workers’ struggles can be supported by independently 
resourced, organised and managed actions. In China state-controlled unions act as mediators and 
brokers between the state and the workers. Also, they operate as mechanisms of state control 
rather than as channels for workers to express their grievances and defend their collective 
interests. Although the authorities may grant citizens the right to hold demonstrations and lodge 
complaints, in the name of maintaining social stability they nearly always prohibit popular action. 
The State Council’s ‘Regulation Concerning Letters and Visits’ (1995, revised 2005) allows 
complainants to petition as a group, but does not permit them to send more than five 
representatives to plead their case at any one time (Article 12 [1995], Article 18 [2005]) (Li and 
O’Brien, 2008: 7). 
 
Given the limit and restrictions of formal channels in voicing collective grievances, collective 
action in China is more likely to be initiated and structured through informal networks. Guanxi 
networks are typically drawn on by collective actors, whether urban protesters or rural activists. 
In the construction of Chinese environmental movements, for instance, individual connections 
and relations among friends, relatives, colleagues, neighbors and so forth are key building blocks 
(Xie and Mol, 2006: 272). Not only do activists draw on existing guanxi connections in voicing 
their grievances, in both urban and rural settings activists engage in building new guanxi, 
especially with officials, journalists and others who may provide leverage, information or in 
other ways contribute to an action against local government, officials or entrepreneurs and 
commercial interests. Also, informal networks including guanxi may be used strategically to 
divert the attention of officials so that charges against collective activists of disruption of social 
order can be avoided (Li and O’Brien, 2008).  
 
Guanxi and the emergence of social movements 
While formal organisations of protest and collective action are illegal in China there is 
nevertheless much evidence of a significant rise of social unrest and collective action since 
marketisation. In 2010, ‘China was rocked by 180,000 protests, riots and other mass incidents—
more than four times the tally from a decade earlier’ (Orlik, 2011). According to research by the 
Chinese Academy of Governance, this number of 180,000 incidents in 2010, is double the 
number of protests that were reported for 2006 (Taylor 2012). Researchers associate protest 
action with widening inequality, official corruption, environmental pollution and violations of 
rights. Since economic reform the disbursement, restructuring, or privatisation of many state-
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owned enterprises has led to the loss of entitlements and employment for millions of urban 
Chinese (Chen, 2000, 2006; Friedman and Lee, 2010). Also, urban development has displaced 
similarly large numbers of rural families from their land and homes, as well as contributing to a 
significant degradation of the environment (O’Brien and Li, 2006; Walker, 2006; Wang, 2012).  
 
Migrant workers are another group of people numbered in the hundreds of millions who suffer 
serious exploitation and abuse, including substandard housing, unsafe work environments and 
failure of a significant number of employers to pay wages (Becker, 2012; Chan and Ngai, 2009; 
Chan and Siu, 2012). The different forms of grievance that emerge from these and similar 
conditions often lead to mass protests, especially after the legal channels for resolving grievances 
have been exhausted and found to be ineffective because of official unresponsiveness, violation 
of citizens’ rights through corruption, or repressive tactics by authorities – or a combination of 
these (He and Xue, 2014; Michelson, 2008; O’Brien and Li, 2006).  
 
Official unresponsiveness to grievances in many cases is itself associated with guanxi networks. 
Officials in China are effectively discouraged from responding promptly and effectively to 
citizens’ complaints. With an absence of institutions of effective public supervision, including 
free elections of officials and a press free of political interference, local officials and courts are 
under no civic pressure to address public grievances. It is not unusual for local political, legal 
and media leaders to be involved in guanxi networks through which their shared interests are 
protected. Local party leaders typically control key personnel appointments, including 
membership of local political and legal committees, head of the Department of Propaganda, and 
managers of leading state-owned local newspapers and TV stations (Lai, 2010: 827). Within 
such institutional arrangements guanxi inevitably plays a key role in official promotions (Zhong, 
2003). In these circumstances appeals from disenfranchised groups for justice will be seen as 
disruptions of public order. 
 
Officials who are not part of the networks of power holders are aware of the risks they would 
take if they were to report or address corrupt behavior or infringement of legitimate economic 
and social rights by the power holders. This has the effect of reinforcing official indifference and 
unresponsiveness to public complaints. As a result of officials’ unresponsiveness to their 
grievances and complaints discontented citizens may be led to resort to collective action, even 
violence, and intentionally disrupt public order, destroy public property and attack government 
offices. The rationale is that by escalating a state of tension protesters may attract the attention of 
some higher authority to their grievances and hope that the higher authority will investigate and 
possibly intervene so that the contentious issues can be resolved (Lai, 2010: 830; O’Brien and Li, 
1995, 2006). 
 
In addition to widened inequality and officials’ unresponsiveness to grievances, another factor 
which contributes to social unrest is corruption. Because guanxi provides particular instead of 
general access to resources and operates through personal relations rather than formal structures, 
there is a tendency for it to facilitate corruption, bribery and malpractice even if it is not 
inherently corrupt (Qi, 2013). Yang  emphasises that ‘guanxixue’s shift into corruption now 
benefits the official-business classes and hurts the bulk of society as a small social segment 
quietly amasses public wealth’ (2002: 466). Indeed, the 1989 June Fourth Movement gained 
wide popular support for opposing corruption and patronage (Zuo and Benford, 1995). It was 
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animated by the unequal access by the party-elite’s offspring to scarce resources, including 
educational opportunities and key state and business employment (Mu and Thompson, 1989). 
Managerial corruption has been identified as a critical factor that shaped laid-off workers’ sense 
of injustice and drove them to protest (Chen, 2000). This corruption typically occurs in the 
transfer of state property to private enterprises in which public or collective resources become 
private wealth. It is not unusual for managers of state-owned enterprises to favour those private 
entrepreneurs who are in their guanxi networks so that both parties may benefit from the transfer 
at the expense of the welfare of the previously employed workers.  
 
In rural areas a similar pattern of corruption has become commonplace. Guanxi connections 
between city or town officials on the one hand and developers on the other facilitate the 
appropriation of land from peasant families who are themselves outside these local elite guanxi 
relations. Peasant families’ land is typically appropriated without adequate compensation. 
Corrupt guanxi connections between officials and developers frequently involve construction 
projects which lead to environmental damage in residential areas, urban and rural, because of 
contraventions of due process. In rural areas corruption seems to be most common in villages of 
average wealth in which cadres attempt to maximise their short-term material benefits from their 
limited access to collective resources (Wang, 2012). Those in the guanxi networks of village 
leaders benefit the most. It is reported in one case study that even though peasants made a series 
of complaints and protests against the misconduct of a village leader who enjoyed a lifestyle 
beyond his means they were ineffective because that leader bought off the township officials 
with whom he frequently drank and gambled, matters of common knowledge among the 
villagers (O’Brien and Li, 1995). 
 
Social movement targets and framing 
In the mainstream social movements literature it is understood that in order to seek benefits for 
their constituency or to achieve recognition by authorities social movements typically target the 
state (Gamson, 1990). In this way activists ‘frame’ a social movement. In mainland China, on the 
other hand, no collective action with similar expectations could operate by directly targeting the 
state (Chan and Ngai, 2009: 289; Chen, 2006; O’Brien and Li, 2006). There are a number of 
reasons why collective action in China is not explicitly directed toward the state. First, the state 
does not tolerate actions, collective or otherwise, that target its policies or ideology. The state 
would regard such attempts as a direct challenge or threat to its rule and legitimacy and they 
would immediately and relentlessly be repressed. A common pattern in China is for mobilised 
workers or peasants to charge that local officials fail to carry out the central policy, and to hold 
that local officials are corrupt and despotic, and to suppose that if informed of local injustices the 
central state authorities will respond with sympathy and upright morality. Aggrieved villagers, 
reported in some studies (see O’Brien and Li, 2006), believed that their chances of getting justice 
are higher the further from local leaders and the closer to central leaders they pitched their 
appeals.  
 
The notion of ‘frames’, then, refers to the interpretive packages developed by activists in order to 
mobilise their potential adherents and constituents (Snow and Benford, 1988). Social movements 
in mainland China are typically framed in a way that avoids targeting the central government. 
Indeed, in China frames are carefully developed not only for mobilisation of collective action but 
also to avoid persecution by the state and if possible to seek alliance with it. Although widely 
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regarded as a pro-democracy movement directed against the party-state, the 1989 June Fourth 
leaders were careful to avoid denying the Communist party’s legitimate leadership (Zuo and 
Benford, 1995: 142) and instead ‘framed’ corruption, profiteering and the creation of inequalities. 
As indicated in the previous paragraph, leaders of collective action usually attribute their woes to 
local violations of a central policy, thus placing the blame for injustice squarely with local 
officials, thus identifying the central government as a powerful potential ally (Li and O’Brien, 
2008: 6). Such a view is not entirely mistaken. While the upper-levels of government seem to be 
tolerant of local officials’ malfeasance or abuse of power in serving so-called public interests, 
they are less tolerant of officials’ abuse of power for corrupt personal gain (Cai, 2010: 71). 
Collective-action leaders accordingly frame their protests against local officials’ corrupt 
behaviour, which typically involves rent-seeking guanxi practices (Wank, 1999; 2009).  
 
It is of interest that the framing strategy of mobilised laid-off workers typically does not 
challenge the government’s policy concerning restructuring state-owned enterprises but instead 
targets collusive agreements between state-owned enterprise managers, local officials and 
outside investors, that is, those who corruptly profit from privatisation at the expense of workers. 
Similarly, peasants typically do not openly express dissatisfaction with the implementation of 
birth control policy but frame their complaints against officials’ corruption or misconduct which 
typically involves rent-seeking guanxi practices. Displaced homeowners do not protest the 
central government’s policies of socialist economic advancement; their protest against land 
appropriations and new constructions are typically in terms of damage to the environment and 
the rent-seeking guanxi practices of local officials and developers through which they are 
displaced without proper compensation.    
 
Ties and information in networks and guanxi 
In standard social network analysis weak ties provide information while strong ties provide 
solidarity. In social movement theory weak ties are regarded as more effective than strong ties in 
the dissemination of activism (McAdam, 1982, 2003; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Morris, 
1984). Strong ties, on the other hand, are held to encourage participation and provide an 
incentive or basis for solidarity. In a classic discussion Granovetter (1973) shows that while 
strong ties characterise well-defined groups weak ties link them to each other, especially by 
communicating what he calls ‘non-redundant’ information to members of strong-tie groups. 
Granovetter (1973: 1371) points out that ‘those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to 
move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information different from 
that which we receive’. Thus new information, according to Granovetter, comes from outside 
strongly bonded groups and is therefore conveyed through weak ties, not strong ties. Social 
movements in contemporary China, on the other hand, display a different pattern of information 
flow and tie strength. 
 
Without being able to rely on government officials to provide accurate information, individuals 
in China typically obtain information about their legal rights and formal procedures through 
informal channels (Becker, 2012: 1385). Becker (2012) shows that rather than relying on 
traditional ties of rural society, including prior family or regional connections, migrant workers 
are more likely to rely on newly established urban ties in order to obtain information, including 
information about the legal system, dispute options and strategies for organising collective action. 
It is of particular interest that Becker shows that information derived from urban ties not only 
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facilitates the protests of migrant workers but in particular facilitates nonviolent protest by 
expanding the number of protest options available, allowing migrants to avoid the costs of 
workplace violence. In contrast, individuals relying primarily on traditional rural ties are more 
likely to use violence in their protest actions. 
 
A feature of bureaucracy in China is not only that it operates hierarchically but also that there is a 
lack of transparency in decision-making and dissemination of information. In rural protests 
information about central government policies and the misconduct of officials is provided 
through the activists’ strong guanxi ties with select village cadres (Wang, 2012: 709), not 
through the weak-tie network links that Granovetter holds disseminate information. 
Particularistic guanxi networks can provide information to their members only on a privileged 
and secretive basis (Barbalet, 2015: 1046-1048) rather than as a free flow found in the account of 
standard network theory which reflects American experience. Information from village cadres 
not only provides activists with information that contributes to the framing of the movement, 
how to mobilise their collective action, but also provides information helping shape tactics 
because it tells them how far their action can go. By possessing inside information protesters 
have knowledge of the regime’s capacity to prevent and contain conflict (Wang, 2012: 698). 
Given the nature of this information its disclosure will incur serious risks for the informer. There 
is a strong incentive, therefore, against an informant providing such information to a weak tie. 
 
Like village protesters, mobilised urban residents also access their guanxi networks to gain 
information which is often crucial in their decision-making for collective action. Cai (2010: 95-
109) reports the case of an urban housing neighbourhood, called BG, built by the Shanghai 
government in the early 1990s on rural land. Residents in BG engaged in a nine-year collective 
action, from 1993 to 2001, against the building of a twenty-six-story building on an open 
greenbelt area. The first leader of the collective action was replaced by another with extensive 
guanxi networks and who was familiar with the laws and regulations concerning city 
construction. Through his strong guanxi networks the new leader, Tan, obtained two pieces of 
crucial information: a construction plan which indicated that the project was illegal, and a report 
on the project by the Street Office which Tan conveyed to the media to discredit the project. 
Tan’s strong ties with a district official enabled him to know the limits of government tolerance 
so he was aware of the boundaries of effective protest. He also obtained advance information 
concerning district government intentions which also aided him in choosing appropriate 
strategies.  As the real estate company was owned by the city government the protests challenged 
the interests of local power holders, and Tan’s informant therefore took great risks. Nevertheless, 
his guanxi connection with Tan, based on trustworthiness, ganqing [emotional feelings of 
personal closeness] and obligation, meant that the confidential information was available to the 
protest movement through its leader. Similar instances of the provision of sensitive and 
confidential information crucial for the success of protests and provided through guanxi are 
reported elsewhere (Xie and Mol, 2006).  
 
Movement outcomes and guanxi  
Research reported in the social movement literature indicates how social ties have positive 
impact on movement recruitment (Diani and McAdam, 2003; Gould, 1991, 1993; McAdam and 
Paulsen, 1993; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980), solidarity (Useem, 1980) and identity 
(McAdam and Paulsen, 1993). Few studies focus on the impact of social networks on the 
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outcomes of collective action. In his study of job attainment, Bian (1997) shows that strong ties 
are advantageous in accessing influence, which is difficult to obtain. Guanxi networks with 
government officials and media can play a significant role in the outcome of a collective action. 
 
The guanxi networks of movement leaders and participants with government officials can play a 
crucial role in achieving an outcome desirable to the protesters. Studies of collective actions (Cai, 
2010; Xie and Mol, 2006; Wang, 2012) show that protesters have a higher rate of success if the 
protests are undertaken by people with insider connections. Protesters are also better positioned 
to escape state persecution if they have ties with the authorities (Su and Feng, 2013: 61). The 
media can also be a powerful ally for protesters but for the majority of individuals who encounter 
injustice the media is not accessible, though connections with media journalists can lead to 
exposure of injustice (Cai, 2010: 89). 
 
The role of the media in protest movements in mainland China has a number of dimensions. 
Public exposure of official misdeeds may damage the reputation of local government. If a 
collective action escalates to the extent that it attracts foreign media attention then there may be 
fear among officials of damage to the reputation of the state. Exposure by media typically affects 
the outcome of a collective action. Cai’s (2010) research mentioned above reports that the media 
in Shanghai were restrained through local power holders’ guanxi connections from reporting the 
urban protests. The protest leader, Tan, had indirect guanxi links with a journalist at the Shanghai 
branch of the Xinhua News Agency. Journalists who did not know Tan but shared a common 
strong-tie link with him, investigated the case and informed city leaders if the issues were not 
appropriately settled the Agency would file a report for internal circulation to central leaders. 
Such a report of misconduct by local leaders may lead to them losing their positions or at the 
most extreme, their lives. This ‘threat’ proved to be one of the crucial reasons for the success of 
this particular collective protest. 
 
Because of the influence of the mass media social movements frequently attempt to form links 
with journalists. In a case study of an environmental movement Xie and Mol (2006) show that 
media coverage raised the profile of the NGO involved, gaining it public support, and exposing 
an aspect of state action. Because of the strong connections which the leader of this movement 
had with journalists it was possible to develop a media campaign to influence public opinion, a 
main plank in the strategy of the anti-dam campaign. The wider the media reports of a movement 
and the injustice it opposes the more likely it is that the movement will attract the attention of 
central leaders. Central state leaders are more concerned with the public reputation of the state 
than local officials and may positively contribute to a resolution of injustice. On the other hand, 
drawing attention to an injustice that the state is responsible for may lead to state repressive 
action against the movement.  
 
Repression and suppression of social movements 
The literature on social movements predominantly considers social networks in terms of their 
positive contribution to movements. But any consideration of social movements in mainland 
China has to pay attention to the way in which social connections are mobilised to destabilise 
and repress collective actions. In discussing the control and repression of collective action in 
China the literature is principally focused on state repression, especially in terms of police 
surveillance and coercion. The role of social connections and especially guanxi in the 
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suppression of collective action, on the other hand, has failed to draw significant research 
attention. It will be briefly shown here that guanxi is not only drawn upon as a means of 
destabilising and demobilising collective actions but that this approach to the management of 
social movements in China is likely to be initiated by the state. 
 
Power is classically known to take coercive, utilitarian and normative forms, each of which is 
employed by different organisational elements of the state in controlling the population subject 
to its rule (Etzioni, 1964; Mann, 2012: 6-12; Neumann, 1950: 168; Russell, 1967: 26). Coercive 
power is employed by the army and the police, utilitarian or material power takes the form of 
costs and benefits usually connected with employment and state entitlements associated with 
employment, while normative power involves persuasion and influence of opinion through 
education, ceremonial honouring and so on. It is frequently reported that in China the police 
force is widely used in dispersing collective action, especially in its early stages. Local 
governments frequently employ thugs to intimidate, discourage and destabilise collective action 
with coercive repression. When local officials are under pressure to maintain social order, 
however, the use of coercive power may be counter-productive. In these circumstances local 
governments may draw on ‘relational repression’, relying on relatives, friends, and native-place 
connections of protesters to defuse popular action (Deng and O’Brien, 2013: 534). 
 
The local state in mainland China increasingly attempts to suppress collective movements 
through use of material and normative power. There are a number of advantages for officials in 
drawing on interpersonal connections in controlling and dispersing social movements. This 
approach does not reflect directly on the authorities as a repressive force. By encouraging the 
relatives, friends and native-place associates of social movement leaders and members to use 
their guanxi to dissuade their contacts from participation in collective action the state is at one 
remove from the management of social movements and is in that sense hidden. It is a preferred 
option for the state because coercive force or violence potentially escalates collective action, 
widens the constituency of participants and may bring new charges of injustice. This would 
indicate an inability of local officials to maintain social order and also expose their misconduct. 
Relocating the lines of conflict, from the public arena in which the police confront protesters, to 
the private or domestic arena, in which friends and relatives pressure individuals in social 
movements to withdraw, effectively suppresses movements and preserves social order without 
direct or publically visible state involvement.  
 
The use of guanxi connections to suppress social movements typically arises through the 
organisation of ‘work teams’. They recruit local officials, staff of public organisations, including 
schools or factories, and the beneficiaries of government payments such as pensioners. These are 
all categories of people directly subject to government influence and likely to have possible ties 
with protesters. Indeed, individuals who have strong guanxi with protesters are obvious targets 
for recruitment to these work teams. Work team members are expected to use their personal 
influence to persuade relatives, friends and fellow townspeople to stand down from involvement 
in protest and collective action. Those members of work teams who fail to ‘transform’ the 
protesters assigned to them may be subject to punishment, including suspension of salary, 




The use of interpersonal connections for the demobilisation and suppression of social movements 
may be most effective in stopping particular episodes or instances of action but cannot guarantee 
a complete demobilisation of a social movement. The major function of ‘relational repression’ 
lies in its capacity to limit the duration and scope of popular actions. In their study of this 
approach Deng and O’Brien (2013) report that some protesters withdrew from social action 
because of their concern for their associates and loved ones, especially fearing that they would 
lose their salary or suffer adverse career prospects. They also report that work team members, 
instead of acting as an agent of the government, occasionally played a mediating role when 
conflicts between protesters and the authorities arose. Some work team members, they also 
report, left their village for fear of being denounced by their peers. Each of these three 
possibilities becomes more likely the stronger the social movement. A counter strategy adopted 
by protesters is to recruit tent-sitters who do not have close relatives in government employment 
or public organisations.  
 
Conclusion 
Through an examination of social movements in contemporary China the paper shows that 
guanxi is not only relevant to the operation and outcome of social movements but also to our 
understanding of how guanxi itself operates in the context of social movements, their 
development and advancement as well as their repression. When considering the contribution of 
theories of social movements based on American and European experiences it is important to 
recognise that many of the assumptions concerning the role and significance of formal 
organisation and the political state cannot be simply transferred to the Chinese context. The 
theoretical understanding in the literature of the role of social networks in social movements in 
particular needs to be carefully reconsidered in the context of social movements in China. 
 
Although guanxi is seldom mentioned in studies of social movements in mainland China it has 
been shown here that guanxi plays a significant if not crucial role in shaping and directing 
collective action. The standard approach of social network analysis, that weak ties are the source 
of new information while strong ties promote solidarity, has been shown here to not apply to the 
Chinese case. An examination of collective actions in China shows the importance of 
distinguishing types of information in terms of what guanxi networks are most likely to provide, 
and the costs of obtaining information useful to social movements. Finally, the role of guanxi in 
suppressing collective action as an alternative to direct state repression has been indicated. In all 
of these considerations the characteristic features of the Chinese case, including the state’s 
monopoly of formal organisation, the significance of the local-state/central-state distinction, and 
the special qualities of guanxi, remind us of the limitations of theories drawn from mainstream 
global north experience and of the need to qualify, refine and expand the conceptualisation of 
social movements and develop social movement theory to understand collective action and 
protest not only in contemporary China but in general terms. 
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